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A B S T R A C T
Based on a spatial extension of an R&D investment model, this paper measures the macroeconomic impact of the
French R&D policy mix on business R&D using regional data. Our measure takes into account not only the direct
eﬀect of policies but also indirect eﬀects generated by the existence of spatial interaction between regions. Using
a unique database containing information on the levels of various R&D policy instruments received by ﬁrms in
French NUTS3 regions over the period 2001–2011, our estimates of a spatial Durbin model with structural
breaks and ﬁxed eﬀects reveal the existence of a negative spatial dependence among R&D investments in regions.
In this context, while a-spatial estimates would conclude that all instruments have a crowding-in eﬀect, we show
that national subsidies are the only instrument that is able to generate signiﬁcant crowding-in eﬀects. On the
contrary, it seems that the design, size and spatial allocation of funds from the other instruments (tax credits,
local subsidies, European subsidies) lead them to act (in the French context) as beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
1. Introduction
Considering the importance of the diverse types of market failure
inherent in R&D activities, most countries have established public ﬁ-
nancial support favoring private R&D investment (Montmartin and
Massard, 2015). States have many measures at their disposal, among
which subsidies and tax credits are the most commonly used.
However, in times of constrained public ﬁnance, issues emerge re-
garding the eﬀectiveness of such policy instruments.
To date, reviews of studies evaluating the impact of R&D subsidies
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014; Dimos and Pugh, 2016) or tax credits
(Castellacci and Lie, 2015; Gaillard-Ladinska et al., 2015) yield mixed
results and are therefore inconclusive. On the whole, it seems that,
much more than the econometric methodology employed, it is the
sectoral or national context and the speciﬁc design and implementation
of the instruments that can explain the heterogeneity of extant em-
pirical results. Speciﬁcally, reviews highlight the importance of two
main contextual elements, both of which create interaction eﬀects that
are generally ignored in existing evaluation studies. The ﬁrst refers
to the implementation of the policy mix in most countries using a di-
versity of instruments acting simultaneously toward the objective of
fostering business R&D. However, evaluation studies that consider
simultaneously the diverse instruments and their possible interactions
are still rare, although notable recent contributions exist (see Dumont,
2017, in particular). The second contextual element that should be
considered for robust evaluation studies concerns the role of spillovers
that create indirect impacts of policy instruments on other beneﬁciaries
as well as non-beneﬁciaries. Indeed, while the economics of innovation
literature has long highlighted the role of knowledge spillovers or other
types of interactions among actors, thus far, few evaluation studies of
public incentives for business R&D have explicitly considered the ex-
istence and impact of such phenomena. We argue that not only can the
ignorance of such issues lead to biased estimates, but moreover, the
mechanisms at stake deserve better consideration to draw lessons on
the conditions for the eﬃciency of public policies.
In particular, if geography matters for the emergence and diﬀusion
of knowledge spillovers, which is soundly supported by the literature on
the geography of innovation (Autant-Bernard et al., 2013; Massard and
Autant-Bernard, 2017), one may expect diﬀerent eﬀects of public in-
centives to R&D investment depending on the spatial distribution of the
R&D activities and the locations of beneﬁciaries. Theoretically, spatial
dependencies can either create positive knock-on eﬀects through
knowledge spillovers or, on the contrary, reinforce negative competi-
tive pressure between territories: with incentives enhancing investment
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.07.009
Received 17 July 2017; Received in revised form 10 July 2018; Accepted 11 July 2018
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: benjamin.montmartin@skema.edu (B. Montmartin), mherreragomez@conicet.gov.ar (M. Herrera),
Nadine.Massard@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr (N. Massard).
Research Policy 47 (2018) 2010–2027
Available online 22 July 2018
0048-7333/ © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
T
in some territories to the detriment of others. Hence, the macro-
economic impact of spatial dependencies is generally undetermined by
theory, and the total crowding-in or crowding-out eﬀects can depend on
which of these forces overcomes the other.
Thus, one of the objectives of this paper is to apply a spatial model
to regional data to better investigate the macroeconomic eﬀect of a mix
of public supports in favor of private R&D by taking into account po-
tential spatial eﬀects.
To that end, France appears to be a particularly relevant case for
two main reasons. First, the spatial distribution of R&D activities in
France is highly agglomerated and exhibits substantial regional dis-
parities. In this context, the debate on the driving force vs. the com-
petitive eﬀects of agglomeration is a sensitive issue for public policy. As
an illustration, outcome diﬀerences between France and Germany, for
instance, may be explained not only by diﬀerences in policy choices but
also by diﬀerences in the spatial dispersion of innovative activities. The
continuum of agglomeration that characterizes a large part of the
German territory creates a very diﬀerent context of spatial interactions
compared to the French case, which seems more subject to shadow
eﬀects because innovative agglomerations are dispersed across the
territory and often surrounded with zones of very low innovative ac-
tivities. Second, the French policy mix for R&D has evolved sub-
stantially in recent years and is now one of the most generous systems
in the world, comprising complex direct and indirect supports.
Speciﬁcally remarkable is the inversion of the ratio between direct and
indirect support for R&D following a reform that introduced a volume
scheme for the R&D tax credit in 2004 and its reinforcement in 2006
and 2008 (when a pure volume-based system without upper limits was
implemented). Indeed, according to the OECD,1 in 2011, France ranked
7th for direct support (0.12% GDP) and was the most generous country
for indirect support (0.26% GDP, 5.2 B EUR of ﬁscal revenue loss).
This paper investigates the eﬀects of the French policy mix on pri-
vate R&D investment by using a unique database containing regionally
aggregated information on the amount of public support received by
ﬁrms in all French metropolitan NUTS3 regions over the period
2001–2011. These data allow us to distinguish four types of policy: R&D
tax credits and regional, national and European subsidies. To run our
analysis, we ﬁrst develop a simple theoretical model of regional R&D
investment based on Howe and McFetridge (1976) and extended to
spatial interactions that provides one explanation for the ambiguous
empirical results obtained concerning the eﬀect of R&D policies. In-
deed, depending on the key parameter values, crowding-out and
crowding-in eﬀects can emerge. This framework will provide a basis for
our empirical estimates. More precisely, we estimate a spatial Durbin
model with temporal regimes and ﬁxed eﬀects. This type of spatial
model allows us to take into account the heterogeneity of regions
through regional ﬁxed eﬀects, the dependency between neighboring
regions and potential structural changes in policies’ impact due to
changes in policies’ design during the considered period.
Thus, our analysis oﬀers three main contributions to the literature
on the evaluation of R&D policies: (i) it simultaneously considers dif-
ferent components of the R&D policy mix, regional, national and
European subsidies and tax credits, and allows interpretation of the
results in terms of the total marginal eﬀect of each instrument on pri-
vate R&D spending; (ii) allowing us to split this total eﬀect into the
direct eﬀect (internal to the considered region) and the indirect eﬀect
(resulting from spatial dependencies between regions), it investigates
how the geography of R&D activities may aﬀect the macroeconomic
eﬀects of policy instruments; and (iii) it also measures the potential
change in the impact of policies that can be related to substantial
changes in the design of the policy mix, especially the switch from an
incremental to a pure volume-based scheme for R&D tax credits in
France.
From a global point of view, our results suggest the relative eﬃ-
ciency of the French policy mix for R&D in the sense that no policies
generate signiﬁcant crowding-out eﬀects and one policy is able to
generate a signiﬁcant crowding-in eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, we provide three
core ﬁndings. First, we observed the presence of a signiﬁcant negative
spatial dependence among R&D investments in NUTS3 regions. This
refers to the polarization of R&D investments into a limited number of
hubs that are geographically distant and surrounded by laggard regions.
In this context marked by shadow eﬀects, untargeted state policies or
competitive local policies are likely to act as beggar-thy-neighbor po-
licies. Second, in this geographical context, while a-spatial estimations
focusing on the direct (within-region) eﬀect would conclude that there
is crowding-in of all instruments, we show that national subsidies are in
reality the only instrument that generates signiﬁcant crowding-in ef-
fects. For the other instruments, it seems that their positive direct eﬀect
is eliminated by negative indirect (between-region) eﬀects due to the
negative spatial dependence with neighboring regions. In other words,
it seems that tax credits and regional and European subsidies foster
competition among regions and thus act as beggar-thy-neighbor po-
licies, resulting in a neutral total eﬀect. On the contrary, national
subsidies (which are often sectorally or territorially targeted) appear to
be eﬃcient in exploiting the complementarity between French regions,
creating positive interregional spillovers that outweigh the negative
spatial dependence among regions. The last main result is the evidence
that the passage from a purely incremental scheme to a pure-volume
scheme for the French tax credit modiﬁed the response of ﬁrms to this
policy. Indeed we ﬁnd a strong negative change in the impact of the tax
credit on R&D investment between the ﬁrst period (2002–2005) and the
second (2006–2011). This corroborates the idea that a pure volume-
based scheme generates more windfall eﬀects than incremental
schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present the related existing literature. Section 3 describes the regional
model of R&D investment that constitutes our theoretical framework. In
Section 4, we present the data and the main descriptive statistics,
highlighting the spatial and temporal features of R&D activities and
policies in France. The empirical estimation strategy is described in
Section 4.3. Section 5 discusses the empirical results in detail. Con-
clusions are presented in Section 6.
2. Related empirical literature
2.1. Recent advances in the evaluation of the direct impact of ﬁnancial
support
Theoretically, the basic idea is that public support will be eﬃcient if
it targets projects that would not be undertaken by ﬁrms without such
grants. Otherwise, incentives will be ineﬀective because they will not
lead to additional investment. Methodologically, diﬀerent measures of
eﬃciency in terms of input additionality2 have been used in the em-
pirical literature (Mohnen and Lokshin, 2009), the objective of which
consists in comparing the policy expenditures with the additional
amount of R&D spent by private ﬁrms. When policy expenditure is more
than compensated for by the additional amount of business R&D
spending, this describes a pure additionality eﬀect (also called the
crowding-in or leverage eﬀect, indicating a complementarity between
public and private funds). On the contrary, partial or full crowding-out
eﬀects appear when there is a partial or full substitution between public
and private funds.
Various phenomena have been theoretically analyzed that can
hamper the expected additionality eﬀects of implemented policies. The
1 http://www.oecd.org/sti/scoreboard.htm.
2 This is the additionality concerning R&D spending. We do not consider here
other forms of additionality such as output additionality (in terms of innova-
tion, for example) or behavioral additionality.
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most frequently discussed is the possibility of opportunistic behaviors
by ﬁrms that can lead to windfall eﬀects (Dimos and Pugh, 2016).
Diﬀerent policy designs are compared according to their risk of giving
rise to substitution strategies between public and private ﬁnancing. This
argument is the starting point of most of the empirical studies evalu-
ating the direct impact of ﬁnancial support for business R&D in dif-
ferent countries and periods. Reviews from Zúñiga-Vicente et al.
(2014), Castellacci and Lie (2015), Gaillard-Ladinska et al. (2015) and
Dimos and Pugh (2016) show that although the additionality hypoth-
esis prevails (or at least there is no evidence of crowding-out), no clear
global feature emerges. Important diﬀerences remain between instru-
ments (tax credits, subsidies or others forms of public support), and
there is also considerable heterogeneity in the eﬀects depending on the
characteristics of ﬁrms or on the context.
Instead of increasing the number of studies that focus on one in-
strument and often one country or one sector, these authors call for the
development of approaches that allow for a comparison and better
understanding of the factors creating heterogeneity in outcomes.
Among the most recent studies in this vein, we select only a few that
oﬀer interesting insights relevant to our perspective.
2.1.1. The development of policy-mix analyses
Major advances have been seen in the development of multi-in-
strument analyses. Indeed, as ﬁrms can generally beneﬁt from a con-
siderable variety of ﬁscal aids and direct supports, studies should
consider multiple treatments for evaluation. Hottenrott et al. (2017),
Huergo and Moreno (2014) and Wang et al. (2017) oﬀer original con-
tributions by considering diﬀerent types of grants or comparing support
oﬀered via subsidies and loans, with a combination of these vehicles
appearing beneﬁcial. More interesting for our purposes are papers that
consider tax credits as part of a policy mix with other types of support.
Generally, these recent papers contribute to strongly mitigate the po-
sitive results obtained when the impact of tax credits is estimated alone
(European Commission, 2014). Speciﬁcally addressing the policy mix
combining R&D tax credits and subsidies, some micro-econometric
studies conclude that the two associated schemes have positive impacts
(Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2009) for the Spanish case, Duguet
(2012) for France, Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) for Canada; Haegeland
and Møen (2007) for Norway and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) in
the German case). Other studies show how the eﬀect of one instrument
is reduced by the introduction of another. Marino et al. (2016) analyze
the impacts of subsidies in the presence or absence of a tax credit re-
gime for the French case. They show that crowding-out eﬀects appear to
be more pronounced under the R&D tax credit regime. Dumont (2017),
considering the Belgian case, shows that the eﬀectiveness of R&D
support decreases when ﬁrms combine subsidies with several tax ben-
eﬁts. Macro-econometric studies have also contributed to the analysis
of policy mixes. Papers conducted on OECD countries in diﬀerent time
periods simultaneously analyze the impact of direct and indirect sup-
port in stimulating private investment in R&D (Guellec and Van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1997; Montmartin and Herrera, 2015). In a
recent contribution also comparing diﬀerent types of public R&D policy
mixes in a large sample of OECD countries, Brown et al. (2017) ﬁnd a
negative impact of R&D tax credits. In other words, it appears that
when associated with important direct support, the impact of indirect
support is lower. It should be noted that such results revealing possible
crowding-out eﬀects have one of three main characteristics: they are
obtained from macroeconometric approaches, and thus implicitly in-
clude not only the intensive but also the extensive margin and possible
distortionary phenomena across ﬁrms and industries; they use con-
tinuous and not binary variables to measure the treatment, the latter of
which are recommended by Dimos and Pugh (2016) to make better
estimations; or they concern Belgium or France, which are the two most
generous countries in the world in terms of public support for private R
&D. Hence, these are possible explanations of the diﬀerences in results
compared to the rest of the literature, although full conﬁrmation would
necessitate further analyses.
2.1.2. Introducing spillovers and possible distortions
Another set of papers is worth mentioning here because in their
attempts to understand diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity, they have
begun to perform analyses addressing spillovers and distortions.
Indeed, although they are clearly theoretically established, distortions
across ﬁrms or industries that may create indirect eﬀects are rarely
considered by the empirical literature on the evaluation of public
support for private R&D. However, distortionary eﬀects across ﬁrms or
industries may also result in global (macroeconomic) crowding-out
eﬀects if the incentives for the supported ﬁrms or sectors are out-
weighed by the resulting disincentives aﬀecting non-supported ﬁrms/
sectors. Only a few macroeconometric approaches implicitly take this
phenomenon into account when measuring additionality at the country
level. Some, cited in the reviews above, consider the variation in the
eﬀects of public incentives across sub-groups of ﬁrms depending on
ﬁrm size and report contradictory results. While in some countries,
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) tend to respond more
strongly to support for R&D, the reverse has been found in other
countries. Evidence suggesting that knowledge spillovers from large
ﬁrms exceed those from small ﬁrms also tend to weaken the case for
targeting tax incentives towards SMEs – even if SMEs will more sub-
stantially increase their R&D expenditures in response to such in-
centives. More recently, sectoral sources of heterogeneity have been
investigated, including the original contributions of Castellacci and Lie
(2015) and Freitas et al. (2017). These papers show that the eﬀects of R
&D tax credits vary across sectors and that the overall eﬀects of R&D tax
credits depend on the interplay between the direct impact on a given
sector and indirect impacts on other sectors due to intersectoral spil-
lover eﬀects. However, although these issues have important implica-
tions for policy choices in terms of sectoral targeting, no existing studies
oﬀer sound estimations of such phenomena.
In this paper, we wish to emphasize another source of heterogeneity
and indirect eﬀects that is still largely ignored by the empirical litera-
ture: the spatial dimension.
2.2. Introducing the spatial dimension into R&D policy evaluation
Papers on the economic geography of innovation have long high-
lighted the existence and importance of spatial dynamics in R&D ac-
tivities. Empirically, this literature demonstrates the speciﬁc role of
geographical proximity in the transmission of knowledge spillovers
(Autant-Bernard et al., 2013). Hence, it reveals the existence of positive
agglomeration eﬀects based on the local nature of knowledge spillovers
and the resulting competition among territories to attract R&D invest-
ment. Thus, as space appears non-neutral for R&D and innovation ac-
tivities, one may expect two main implications in terms of additionality
measures. First, there may be spatial heterogeneity: ﬁrms in diﬀerent
territories may react diﬀerently to similar public incentives. Second,
spatial interdependency phenomena imply that R&D activities within
one place depend on R&D activities in other places. These dependencies
may be positive when they result from knowledge spillovers and con-
tribute to the diﬀusion of the initial incentive eﬀects to neighbors. They
may also be negative if the competition between regions create dis-
tortion: the positive incentive impact in one region translating into a
negative impact for neighboring regions. At the macroeconomic level,
one would only observe a change in the relative weight of regions with
respect to R&D investment with no signiﬁcant overall impact. More-
over, there is a possibility that crowding-out eﬀects will appear if the
negative spatial dependence outweighs the positive eﬀect of spatial
knowledge spillovers. Thus far, however, very few evaluation studies
have considered the role of spatial heterogeneity due to agglomeration
and the possibilities of spatial dependencies among actors. As for the
other sources of heterogeneity and spillover mentioned above, ignoring
these phenomena can lead not only to biased econometric estimations
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but also prevent public authorities from making informed choices
concerning the design of their policy mix.
To our knowledge, only two macro-econometric analyses using
spatial econometrics have contributed to the measurement of interac-
tions between instruments implemented in diﬀerent, neighboring jur-
isdictions. Using OECD country data, Montmartin (2013) concludes that
external complementarity of ﬁnancial support exists at the country
level. Wilson (2009) focuses on the US case and evaluates the sensitivity
of the R&D investments of ﬁrms located in one U.S. state to in-state and
out-of-state tax credits (from neighboring states). His results show that
if ﬁrms react positively to in-state tax credits, they also react negatively
to out-of-state tax credits. More precisely, these reactions are estimated
to be of the same magnitude, implying no eﬀect from these “local” tax
credits at the macroeconomic level. It should be noted that these two
opposite results are obtained at diﬀerent geographical levels. They may
therefore suggest that the existence of external complementarity or
substitutability depends on the geographical unit considered. One
simple explanation for this is that agglomeration economies are often
observed at intra-country agglomeration levels. There are also geo-
graphical limits to the capacity of ﬁrms’ to react to R&D incentives.
Indeed, it is clearly easier for ﬁrms to change their investment locations
within one country than between countries in response to incentives.
2.2.1. Advantage of regionally aggregated data for evaluation
To our knowledge, only Wilson (2009)'s paper uses aggregated data
at the intra-national level. We argue, however, that this level of analysis
using regional aggregated data within countries allows for original
approaches and that these data are the most relevant for addressing
spatial issues in the evaluation. The advantage of regional data for the
evaluation of public support for business R&D is threefold:
(i) They make it possible to better account for spatial/territorial het-
erogeneity. Compared to country-level, regional data allow for
ﬁner and more relevant analysis, as regional data better corre-
spond to the level at which local knowledge spillovers and ag-
glomeration eﬀects can impact ﬁrms’ innovative activities.
Regional data also provide location information that is not usually
possible to obtain for each ﬁrm in large microeconomic databases.
Using regional data also allows for the consideration, at the terri-
torial level, of the combined eﬀect of the extensive and intensive
margins. Indeed, micro-econometric studies are generally focused
on the intensive margin (i.e., impact on the intensity of R&D in-
vestment within ﬁrms that already pursue R&D activities).
However, leverage eﬀects at the territorial level may result not
only from the intensive but also from the extensive margin (i.e., the
entry of new ﬁrms into R&D activities).
(ii) These data are relevant for the evaluation of a multilevel policy
mix combining the regional, national and European levels. Indeed,
while the political economy of multilevel interventions is largely
developed within diverse federal frameworks or in the European
context, we are not aware of studies introducing this dimension of
the policy mix into evaluation exercises. Lanahan and Feldman
(2015) contributes to the debate concerning innovation policies in
a federal context, and some papers based on the CIS survey com-
pare the impact of national and European supports on ﬁrm per-
formance. However, none of them introduce regional policies.
However, the European context has recently contributed to re-
inforcing regional issues while simultaneously questioning their
eﬃciency. In this respect, consider Breidenbach et al. (2016), who
reveal the risk of negative overall impacts of regional policies
when they are too targeted on attractivity issues and thereby
contribute to reinforce the negative impact of competition between
regions. Therefore, the regional level appears to be a particularly
interesting setting to study policy mix implemented via multilevel
intervention within the European context and implement spatial
econometric models that allow us to measure the relative
implications of diﬀerent forms of spatial dependencies across re-
gions (positive or negative) when estimating the overall eﬀects of
public policies.
(iii) Considering spatial entities within a single institutional context (a
country), regional data facilitate the identiﬁcation of temporal
structural changes due to public policy changes within this
country, thereby allowing a ﬁner interpretation of the impacts in
terms of the characteristics of the policy mix and instrument de-
sign.
In France, the highly agglomerated spatial structure and the evo-
lution of the policy mix since the early 2000s has contributed to re-
inforcing the relevance of such spatial approaches using regional data.
In the following section, we develop a theoretical framework for the
analysis of regional R&D investment that will form the basis for our
empirical study using French regional data.
3. Theoretical framework
3.1. A regional model of R&D investment
The model developed in this paper is based on the conceptual R&D
investment framework proposed by Howe and McFetridge (1976) and
David et al. (2000). The idea is that each ﬁrm has some potential R&D
projects in the pipeline and is able to estimate the rate of return and the
cost of capital for these projects. R&D projects are perfectly divisible,
meaning that each ﬁrm faces a marginal rate of return (MRR) and a
marginal cost of capital (MCC) function depending on its level of R&D
expenditure. The MRR is a decreasing function of and the MCC is an
increasing function of the level of R&D expenditure. Obviously those
functions are also strongly inﬂuenced by other variables such as public
R&D policies (see David et al., 2000 for a detailed discussion).
The diﬃculty we face is to translate the complexity of this micro-
economic conceptual framework into a regional analytic framework.
First, we assume that at a given point in time t, there is a ﬁxed but
relatively large number of ﬁrms in each region such that the MRR and
MCC functions for a region are simply the aggregation of the MRR and
MCC functions of ﬁrms located in that region. Second, we specify
generalized CES functions to describe the complex inﬂuence of R&D
policies on the MRR and MCC functions of a region. This functional
form allows R&D policies and other inﬂuential variables to be imperfect
substitutes for ﬁrms’ private R&D cost and proﬁtability. Moreover, it
allows each variable to have a speciﬁc inﬂuence on the MRR and MCC
functions and the number of variables can have positive or negative
eﬀects on the two functions. In other words, having more public po-
licies does not necessarily imply greater eﬃciency (or vice versa).
Thus, we deﬁne the MRR and MCC functions in region i as:
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where δi > 0 and ψi > 0 are region i's speciﬁc time-invariant elements
of the MRR and MCC functions, Ri is the level of private R&D invest-
ment, and Xki≥ 0, k=1, …, K represent public policy variables and
other variables aﬀecting both the MRR and MCC functions. μk and σk are
the share parameters of the CES functions representing the importance
of each variable in the MCC and MRR functions. α∈]0, ∞ [and
β∈]−∞, 0[represent the elasticity of MCC and MRR, respectively,
with respect to R&D investment. λ > 0 and v 0> represent the returns
to scale for the X variables in the MCC and MRR functions. These
functions also assume a constant elasticity of substitution between two
X variables given by η=1/(1− ρ).
The equilibrium amount of private R&D in the i-th region is
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obtained when the aggregate MRR function equals the MCC function,
that is,
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This last expression implies a non-linear speciﬁc eﬀect of each Xk
variable on the level of private R&D investment. Consequently, the
theoretical impact of a policy variable k is complicated to discuss and
interpret. Nevertheless, if the elasticity of substitution between X
variables is near 1 (i.e., if ρ→ 0), expression (3) can be rewritten (using
the translog approximation proposed in Hoﬀ, 2004) as:
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Where o(ρ) represents all-non linear and cross eﬀects of X variables and
the linear approximation error. As shown in Appendix A.1, our dataset
seems to support the hypothesis that ρ→ 0, and thus, in what follows,
we assume that o(ρ) is negligible. Using this approximation, our model
is able to provide important implications for the channels through
which public R&D policies generate crowding-in or crowding-out ef-
fects on R&D investment. To see this, we study the elasticity of R&D
investment with respect to a public policy k:
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This last expression highlights the six parameters (α, β, v, λ, σk and μk)
that are critical to explain the eﬀect of a public policy at the regional
level.
Let us consider ﬁrst the denominator of (5) that refers to the shape
of the MCC and MRR functions with respect to the level of R&D in-
vestment (α and β). The lower the value of α− β is, the greater the
eﬀect of public policies on R&D investment. An extreme case appears
when regions face inelastic MRR and MCC functions (α→∞ and β→
−∞). Indeed, in that case, public policies are not able to inﬂuence the
MRR and MCC functions and public policies generate only crowding-
out eﬀects. An inelastic MRR function will appear when there is no
possibility for regions to appropriate the innovation beneﬁts or there is
no innovation potential. An inelastic MCC function will appear when
regions are composed of asset-constrained ﬁrms that cannot access
external funding. Another extreme case appears when regions face
perfectly elastic MCC and MRR functions (α→ 0 and β→ 0). In that
case, public policies strongly inﬂuence R&D investment, as regions are
fully able to beneﬁt from them, which will result in a crowding-in ef-
fect. Thus, a crowding-out eﬀect of public policies is more likely to
occur in a region where supported ﬁrms are asset-constrained and face
limited technological opportunities. Hence, empirical evidence of the
heterogeneity of policy eﬀects depending on the characteristics of ﬁrms
and sectors may be theoretically explained, and this model has the
advantage of theoretically supporting the possibility that regions with
diﬀerent ﬁrm demographics and/or diﬀerent sectoral specializations
will react diﬀerently to public R&D policies.
The second part of the elasticity (numerator) involves the returns to
scale of public policies and their share parameters. From a theoretical
perspective, most eﬀects of public support for R&D will materialize
through an impact on the MCC function (see David et al., 2000). Indeed,
the external eﬀects of public policies, such as potential learning,
training or reputation eﬀects, will take more time to inﬂuence the MRR
function. This is why we will focus the discussion on the two para-
meters related to the MCC function, λ and μk. λ∈]0, ∞ [measures the
returns to scale of a public policy on the MCC function. For asset-con-
strained regions, we can easily imagine that the returns to scale of R&D
support are greater than for non-constrained regions (see Zúñiga-
Vicente et al., 2014). Indeed, for those regions, signaling eﬀects may
imply greater returns of R&D support on the MCC function by allowing
them to, for instance, access external capital. Consequently, increasing
returns to scale of public policies are more likely to appear for asset-
constrained regions. μk represents the share parameter of a public policy
k in the MCC function (which should be negative, as public support
decreases costs). In other words, it represents the importance of a public
policy in the MCC of regions. Let us assume a simple tax credit of 1% of
total R&D investment for the whole country. Then, the value of μk will
be very low, as will be the net eﬀect of the policy on R&D investment.
Assume now that for the same cost, policy-makers change the policy
and implement a 10% tax credit for asset-constrained regions. Then, for
those regions, the value of μk will be much higher, and we can expect a
greater eﬀect of the policy on R&D investment. Thus, our model sug-
gests that a public policy is more likely to generate a crowding-out
eﬀect on R&D investment if its ﬁnancial endowment is too low and/or
untargeted. This echoes the ﬁnding in empirical literature of the ne-
cessity of using a continuous measure of the policies instead of only
dichotomous variable because eﬃciency is not only a question of
beneﬁting or not from the policy but also a question of how large the
ﬁnancial support is.
3.2. The spatial extension of the model
Thus far, our model has assumed closed regions. Nevertheless, as
highlighted above, it is diﬃcult to assume complete independence of R
&D investment choices between actors located in neighboring regions.
To translate the empirical evidence of spatial interactions into our
framework, we introduce into the model an inﬂuence of private R&D
investment by other regions on the MRR and MCC functions of a par-
ticular region. Obviously, the inﬂuence of each region j≠ i on region i
would not be uniformly distributed. Again, the empirical literature on
the geography of innovation highlights the importance of diﬀerent
forms of proximity and, especially, geographical proximity in the
transmission of knowledge and competitive interactions (Autant-
Bernard et al., 2013). Hence, assuming that spatial proximity is a major
source of dependency between private R&D investment decisions, we
introduce these elements into our framework by extending the MRR (1)
and MCC (2) functions in the following way:
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where wji is a measure of the proximity between region j and region i,
and Rj the level of private R&D investment in region j. As in the simple
model, the equilibrium amount of private R&D in the i− th region is
obtained when the aggregate MRR function equals the MCC function.
By applying a translog approximation and exploiting the fact that ρ is in
the neighborhood of 0, we can write:
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With this last expression, the elasticity of R&D investment with respect
to a public policy k becomes:
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A new element of the elasticity of R&D investment appears, which
measure the inﬂuence of a public policy k on Ri due to spatial
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dependence. Indeed, Ri is inﬂuenced by Rj, which itself is inﬂuenced by
Ri and, thus, the level of public support k received by region i. More
generally, the introduction of a spatial dimension into our model im-
plies that public support received by ﬁrms in neighboring regions will
also inﬂuence the reactions of local ﬁrms. The impact of spatial de-
pendence on the eﬃciency of public support depends on the elasticities
of the MCC (ω) and MRR (φ) functions with respect to the level of
neighboring R&D investment. In the economic literature, the net eﬀect
of R&D spillovers depends on two well-known eﬀects (see Montmartin
and Massard, 2015): the “standing on shoulders” and the “ﬁshing in the
same lake” eﬀects. If the “standing on shoulders” eﬀect is strong, R&D
executed by neighbors will beneﬁt local ﬁrms and could lead to a de-
crease in the costs of some R&D projects in the pipeline (a negative
value for ω). Importantly the “standing on shoulders” eﬀect is likely to
appear when technological opportunities are high. If the “ﬁshing in the
same lake” eﬀect is strong, this will reinforce competitive pressure, and
thus, more R&D projects undertaken in neighboring regions can de-
crease the returns of R&D projects in the local ﬁrms’ pipelines (a ne-
gative value of φ). This eﬀect is likely to appear in sectors where there
are patent races and/or low technological opportunities. Consequently,
the inﬂuence of spatial dependence on the eﬃciency of public policies
is likely to be driven by the net eﬀect of R&D spillovers. In other words,
we argue that the empirical measure of spatial dependence is in part
responsible for the net eﬀect of R&D spillovers between regions. Ob-
viously, a negative spatial dependence would tend to reduce the net
positive eﬀect of public policies at the macroeconomic level. Thus, it
appears very important to take into account spatial dependence to as-
sess the impact of public policies.
4. Descriptive statistics and empirical stategy
Based on this theoretical background, we develop an empirical
analysis of the French case.
4.1. Data
We constructed a balanced panel for 94 French departments (ex-
cluding Corsica and overseas departments) over the period 2001–2011.
French departments correspond to NUTS3 European territorial zones.
The data were provided by the French Ministry of Research and ob-
tained from two main sources: the R&D survey and the ﬁscal database
on R&D tax credits.
4.1.1. R&D expenditure and subsidies
The R&D survey is collected each year by the French Ministry of
Research and provides information at the ﬁrm level on R&D activities
and, particularly, on domestic R&D expenditures (DERD) and the
sources of R&D ﬁnancing.
This survey database is organized into three ﬁles: the ﬁrst at the
enterprise level gives information allowing to characterize the ﬁrms,
the second at the R&D sector level gives information on the ﬁnancial
sources used by the ﬁrms to develop their R&D activities and the third
at the department level gives information on the R&D executed in each
department by ﬁrms (expenditure and staﬀ). As our objective is to es-
timate the responsiveness of business R&D to diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial
support for R&D, data on professional organizations (such as technical
centers), which cannot directly beneﬁt from the R&D tax credit, have
been excluded from our database. Some methodological considera-
tions3 led us to restrict the time considered to the period 2001–2011.
This database allows us to distinguish diﬀerent types of subsidies
according to their sources of ﬁnancing: SCEE (European subsidies re-
ceived from the European Commission); SNAT (total of the subsidies
received from various French Ministries, i.e., national subsidies); and
SREG (subsidies received from local authorities, i.e., essentially regions
and departments). However subsidies information is given at the ﬁrm/
sector level. So, in order to correctly geo-localized subsidies in each
department we had to match the diﬀerent ﬁles and redistribute the
subsidies proportionally to the R&D executed in each department and
sector by each ﬁrm.
4.1.2. Tax credit
The tax credit ﬁle is collected by the ﬁscal administration. It is ex-
haustive and details at the ﬁrm level the amount of R&D that has been
declared and the amount of tax credits that have been granted.
Aggregated data at the department (NUTS3) level were provided to us
by the General Directorate for Research and Innovation of the Ministry
of Research. Matching these data with those from the R&D survey at the
department level involved some methodological decisions. In short, the
most diﬃcult problem we faced concerns the location of R&D tax
credits. The amount of tax credits received in each department does not
correspond to the amount of R&D declared and executed by ﬁrms.
Indeed, it matches only for enterprises that are independent or mem-
bers of a group that are not ﬁscally integrated. In the case of a ﬁscally
integrated group, only one enterprise (frequently, a ﬁnancial holding)
actually beneﬁts from the tax credit, while the basis for this tax credit is
the R&D declared by the all enterprises in this group regardless of their
location. Therefore, to account for possible location biases due to the
legal and ﬁscal organization of ﬁrms and groups, we computed a re-
localized measure for tax credit (TC) using this localized information
contained in the R&D survey. Further details on the calculation used for
relocation of the TC are given in Appendix B.
Table 1 gives the main statistics for our variables pooled over the
period considered. Our dependent variable (DERDF) refers to the pri-
vately ﬁnanced part of the DERD (once all subsidies and tax credits are
deducted). Note also we use the one period lag of Tax credit (LTC) as
the level of Tax credit receive in t is based on R&D spending in t− 1.
Consequently, we will not able to exploit information in year 2001 and
we focus on the period 2002–2011.
4.2. The evolution of the French policy mix
A complete description of the objectives and selection schemes of
each innovation policy instrument implemented in France during the
2000s is beyond the scope of this article. Indeed, a recent report of
France Strategy (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2016) highlights the sharp increase
in the number of devices at the disposal of actors to foster innovation,
from 30 in 2000 to 62 in 2015. In the following section we show how
our data allows us to summarize such a complex landscape. By focusing
on 4 main groups of instruments (TC, regional, national and European
subsidies), we illustrate how their main objectives and characteristics
may impact on the spatial dimension of R&D activities in France. The
stated priority of French authorities during the 2000s was to foster
private R&D spending as this objective mobilizes two thirds of French
public means dedicated to innovation policies (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2016)
and explains for a large part the switch toward a tax-credit driven
policy mix. While this objective covers all the policy instruments, their
precise scheme may or may not be associated with other objectives.
4.2.1. The switch toward a tax-credit-driven policy mix
Our data cover the 2001–2011 period, which means that the period
contains various important reforms to French public R&D policy.
During the early 2000s, France, combined important direct aid for en-
terprises with ﬁscal incentives. However, in the middle of the 2000s,
major changes occurred.
In 2004, France started to switch from a purely incremental system
of tax credits toward a volume-based scheme, a reform that was
3 Before 2001, for example, only enterprises that employ at least 1 full-time
researcher were considered in the survey. After that date, the survey provides
information on all enterprises that conduct R&D even if they employ no or
fewer than one researcher. Hence, it oﬀers better information on small ﬁrms.
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reinforced in 2006 and 2007, and since 2008, these tax credits in France
have been calculated on a pure volume basis without a ceiling.
Consequently, the global trend is that of a sharp increase in the share of
R&D expenditures covered by the tax credit starting from around 2006
(see Fig. 1 for an illustration of these changes). More precisely, TC re-
presents 3% of DERD in 2002–2004, then increases to 11% in
2005–2008 and is set at 22% in 2009–2011.
Due to this primary change in the French policy mix, the incentive
scheme and the characteristics of the population of beneﬁciaries were
modiﬁed from mid-2000s onward. Consequently, we suspect that a
structural change in the eﬀect of R&D policies may exist in our data
distinguishing the early 2000s from the late 2000s.
4.2.2. The multi-level subsidies policy
Concerning subsidies, after 2005, the launch of the competitiveness
pole policies in France resulted in new criteria for supporting projects in
which sectoral and territorial strategies dominate. Associated with the
evolution of European regional policy, which clearly puts emphasis on
the necessity of developing regional strategies for research and in-
novation in the 2007–2013 program, this contributed to increase the
share of regional subsidies in the total direct public aid for private R&D.
More important, strategies designed to reinforce networking and ag-
glomeration eﬀects are becoming central which may have implications
in terms of spatial dependence.
The data in Table 2 conﬁrm a slight increase in the importance of
regional subsidies in the French policy mix after 2005. Their im-
portance compared to national subsidies, however, remains very low,
which may limit their eﬃciency.
Concerning European subsidies, we observe a reduction in the
average subsidy during the second period, which is associated with
greater heterogeneity in the allocation and suggests greater con-
centration of such support in speciﬁc regions.
4.2.3. The spatial structuration of business R&D investment and policy
Focusing now on the spatial distribution of R&D activities and po-
licies, we observe in Fig. 2 a high concentration of privately ﬁnanced R
&D investment in a few NUTS3 regions, which are rather dispersed
across the territory and surrounded by NUTS3 regions with low private
R&D investment. It should be noted that this structure, which reveals a
negative dependence between neighboring regions, is fairly stable
throughout the period considered. It is also interesting to see in Fig. 3
that the spatial concentration of GDP measure by the Gini coeﬃcient is
substantially lower than the spatial concentration of private R&D
spending, suggesting a more important impact of the spatial dimension
on the latter.
By contrast, Fig. 3 also shows that the spatial distribution of public
support has evolved and exhibits contrasting tendencies. National
subsidies are the most concentrated. Tax credits are the least con-
centrated instruments, and their dispersion increased with the reforms
introduced between 2004 and 2008. Interestingly, whereas the total
amount of regional subsidies increased over our period, the Gini coef-
ﬁcient decreased, revealing a more extensive than intensive process (an
increasing number of regions developing local policies).
Tax credits that cover a larger part of R&D spending for SMEs than
for large ﬁrms display a slightly lower index of spatial concentration
than private R&D investment. However, as it is a market driven in-
strument that leaves the strategic orientation of R&D up to private
ﬁrms, it largely follows the underlying spatial dynamics of private in-
vestment in R&D. Subsidies, on the contrary, are generally mission-
oriented and sector-targeted instruments.
The two main objectives followed by subsidy programs in France,
along with the development of private R&D are: the development of
public/private collaboration on the one hand, and support for en-
trepreneurship and the development of young, innovative ﬁrms on the
other hand. Oriented toward strategic actors and sectors, national
subsidies in France are traditionally highly concentrated. Two main
Table 1
Summary statistics (pooled) – in millions of Euros.
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. p50 Min. Max.
Dependent
DERDF 940 204.521 415.045 64.499 −0.415 2790.547
Explanatories
GDP 940 18676 23349 12408 1400 191969
LTC 940 22.458 54.935 5.361 0 557.090
SNAT 940 26.057 85.229 2.449 0 726.508
SCEE 940 1.681 4.395 0.184 0 49.352
SREG 940 0.705 2.167 0.126 0 32.246
Fig. 1. Financial support for private R&D in France 2002–2011 (in millions of Euros).
Source: French Ministry of Research (MENESR), own calculations.
Table 2
Importance of direct support by source of ﬁnancing (% DERD).
Variables Mean S.D. p50 Min. Max.
Period 2002–2005
SNAT/DERD 6.95 10.73 2.88 0 69.66
SCEE/DERD 0.52 0.84 0.22 0 8.23
SREG/DERD 0.25 0.88 0.06 0 14.05
Period 2006–2011
SNAT/DERD 7.46 11.21 3.84 0 81.53
SCEE/DERD 0.46 0.95 0.27 0 16.83
SREG/DERD 0.60 1.19 0.20 0 13.99
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evolutions, however, may explain the important decrease of the con-
centration of national subsidies during the period. The ﬁrst is the im-
portant reduction of the subsidies dedicated to support the defense
sector, which is highly concentrated in big ﬁrms. The second corre-
sponds to the development of the National Agency of Research (ANR)
and the Competitive Cluster Policy (labeling of the 71 clusters covering
the entire French territory), which introduced a diversiﬁcation in the
sector and actors supported and gave incentives to cross-regional col-
laborative projects. By contrast, regional subsidies are more oriented
toward the endogenous development of innovative activities when they
support entrepreneurship or SMEs. Also, when regional subsidies sup-
port collaborative activities they clearly select projects depending on
the involvement of local actors, encouraging collaboration within re-
gions much more than interregional collaboration. This orientation
toward the attractiveness of territory may create competitive pressures
between regions, even though the extensive growth in the number of
regions that implemented innovation policies has resulted in an im-
portant reduction in their spatial concentration.
Finally, European subsidies for R&D are mostly issued from the
Frameworks Programs for R&D and are highly selective in terms of
sectors as well as scientiﬁc excellence, leading to a high concentration
level. They also aim to foster collaborative projects, however, interna-
tional collaborations are privileged and European subsidized projects
generally involve a few actors from the same country. Therefore, there
is competition between the actors and regions within a country in order
to access European funding in speciﬁc scientiﬁc ﬁelds.
4.3. The empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy entails developing the correct empirical
speciﬁcation to assess the crowding-in or crowding-out eﬀect of the
French policy mix for R&D in line with our theoretical model. Our
strategy comprises two steps: (1) detect the main econometric issues
aﬀecting panel data and (2) detect the presence of spatial dependence.
If panel data are more interesting in terms of inference, their use
also implies more potential problems, as we face both time and cross-
sectional dimensions. The main common problems are hetero-
skedasticity, serial correlation, cross-section correlation, endogeneity
and stationarity. In general, only the ﬁrst problem implies ineﬃciency
of the OLS estimator whereas the others imply inconsistency and
Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of the private R&D – in Euro thousands.
Fig. 3. Evolution of the Gini coeﬃcient for R&D, subsidies and tax credit.
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ineﬃciency. We thus decide to start the empirical strategy by identi-
fying which of those problems are present in our dataset. We conduct
all necessary tests using the FE estimator (panel OLS estimator). All
detailed test results are reported in Appendix C. These results show that
we face two main problems in our data: cross-sectional dependence and
heteroskedasticity in the error term. At this step, we suspect that the
presence of cross-sectional correlation could be due to the presence of
spatial dependence in R&D investment, as suggested by our theoretical
model. Concerning the problem of heteroskedasticity, we can easily
address it by correcting for the variance/covariance matrix of the error
term. The three other common problems do not seem to be present.
Indeed, various serial correlation tests reject the assumption of ﬁrst-
order correlation. Concerning endogeneity, we might well suspect
problems related to omitted variables because (1) the true theoretical
model could be dynamic rather than static, and (2) some of the ex-
planatory variables might be endogenous. However, the results in
Appendix C show that we do not detect important problems related to
omitted variables because we reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity
for all explanatory variables (using LTC, i.e., a one-year lag for the TC
variable), and the estimation of a dynamic model shows that the dy-
namic coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. Finally, the various unit root tests that
we implemented show that both the endogenous and exogenous vari-
ables are stationary, and thus, we avoid spurious regression problems.
Before switching to the second step of our empirical strategy, we
decide to check for outliers in our dataset that can partially explain the
problems of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. We
identify two outliers: the Midi-Pyrénés region and the Creuse region in
2010. We thus decide to control for these two outliers using dummies.
Finally, one important point to check when we use a static model with
temporal data is the existence of structural changes in the eﬀect of the
explanatory variables. Indeed, the important reforms to the French
policy mix for R&D discussed in the previous section could have
structurally changed ﬁrms’ behavior and thus modiﬁed their reaction to
public policies. To identify the presence of structural changes, we run
global Chow tests using diﬀerent years as the date of the change. The
results presented in Appendix D clearly detect the presence of changes
in the values of the coeﬃcients between the two periods (regardless of
what year is considered as the break). Nevertheless, although we detect
the presence of structural changes, these initial results do not tell us
which year is best to capture this change in the eﬀect of the explanatory
variables. To decide this, we run four diﬀerent FE estimates with dif-
ferent years as the break and compare their eﬃciency. As shown in
Table D.2, the FE estimations indicate clearly that 2006 is the best
candidate for the break point. Detecting a joint structural break in 2006
when we consider the whole model does not mean that the coeﬃcients
of all the explanatory variables have structurally changed between the
two periods. We thus have to test for the presence of a break in-
dividually for each variable. The results of these Chow tests are re-
ported in Table D.3 in appendix. We only detect a structural break in
the eﬀect of GDP and TC. This thus implies that the eﬀects of European,
national and local subsidies do not show any signiﬁcant variation be-
tween periods, and we can assume that the coeﬃcients of these vari-
ables are stable throughout the studied period.
The objective of the second step of our empirical strategy is to test
for and model the presence of spatial dependence in the data. Indeed,
our theoretical model and the presence of cross-section correlation in
our data suggest this.
In econometrics, the spatial dependence among the regions at each
point in time is modeled using a spatial weight matrix denoted W. The
spatial weight is a positive square matrix, pre-speciﬁed by the re-
searcher, that describes the arrangement of the cross-sectional units in
the sample (Anselin, 1988). The elements ofW, wij, are non-zero when i
and j are hypothesized to be neighbors, zero otherwise. By convention,
the diagonal elements wii are equal to zero, that is, we exclude a unit
being its own neighbor. In this paper, we construct our spatial matrix
using a contiguity criterion.4
Starting from the basic econometric model yt= Xtβ+ ut, where yt is
a vector of order (n×1), Xt is a matrix of n×(k+1) dimension with
β′=[β0, β1, …, βk] and ut as a composite error term. We can model
three channels of spatial dependence using a spatial matrix W: (1) a
global spatial dependence through the dependent variable (Wyt); (2) a
local spatial dependence through the explanatory variables (WXt); and
(3) a global spatial dependence through the error term (Wut). The table
below summarize the diﬀerent empirical spatial models5:
The introduction of spatial eﬀects in empirical applications could be
motivated either due to data speciﬁcity, data-driven speciﬁcation, or on a
theoretical background, theory-driven speciﬁcation, following a formal
speciﬁcation of spatial interaction in an economic model (Anselin,
2002). Our theoretical model assumes that there exists a global spatial
dependence in the private R&D investment of regions that corresponds
to spatial dependence in our dependent variable (Wyt), or to a SLM in
Table 3. However, the empirical spatial dependence could in reality be
much more complex than that reﬂected in our framework and we use a
data-driven speciﬁcation in order to explore alternative models. Under
the data-driven speciﬁcation, there are two general ways to specify the
appropriate spatial empirical model. On the one hand, the usual way is
to apply a sequential procedure, known as speciﬁc-to-general modeling
(STGE) or a “bottom-up” approach (Florax and Folmer, 1992). On the
other hand, we could start with a very general model that is over-
parameterized, known as general-to-speciﬁc modeling (GETS) (Hendry,
1979) or a “top-down” approach. In this paper, we apply Hendry's
approach because Mur and Angulo (2009) shows that the GETS ap-
proach is more robust to the existence of anomalies in the data gen-
erating process.6
Following Hendry's strategy, we should start with the most general
spatial models. The spatial econometric literature suggests two alter-
natives (LeSage and Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2014): The ﬁrst is the spatial
Durbin model (SDM), which includes the spatial lag of endogenous
(Wyt) and exogenous variables (WXt). The second, the spatial Durbin
error model (SDEM) includes the spatial lag of the error term (Wut) and
the exogenous variables (WXt). These two models are not nested in one
another, meaning that empiricists need to estimate both and compare
their eﬃciency. In order words, we have to select between:
β θρy Wy X WX uSDM: ,t t t t t= + + + (10)
β θ ελy X WX u u WuSDEM: , .t t t t t t t= + + = + (11)
Table 4 summarizes the results obtained from the estimation of the
SDM and SDEM (complete results are available upon request). As both
models introduce spatial dependence through the explanatory variables
(WXt), we focus the comparison of these two models on their key dif-
ference: the channel of global spatial dependence. Indeed, global spatial
dependence is embedded in the dependent variable (Wyt) in the SDM,
Table 3
Empirical alternatives of spatial models.
Model Complete name Wyt WXt Wut
SLX Spatial lag in x's × ✓ ×
SEM Spatial error model × × ✓
SLM Spatial lag model ✓ × ×
SDM Spatial Durbin model ✓ ✓ ×
SDEM Spatial Durbin error model × ✓ ✓
4 The robustness of the results were checked using diﬀerent weight matrices.
These results are available upon request.
5 Here, we do not consider the GNS model (which includes Wyt, WXt and
Wut) or the SARAR model (which includes Wyt and Wut) as empirical spatial
models because their parameters are weakly identiﬁed; see LeSage and Pace
(2009) and Elhorst (2014) for details.
6 Further details on the relative merits of GETS and STGE in spatial econo-
metrics can be found in Florax et al. (2003, 2006 and Mur and Angulo (2009).
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whereas it is embedded in the error term for the SDEM. Our results
show that the global spatial dependence through the dependent vari-
able (Wyt) is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, whereas it is just signiﬁcant, at
the 10% level, through the error term. This is clearly in favor of the
SDM, which is conﬁrmed by the two information criteria.
Nevertheless, if SDM is preferred over SDEM, this does not mean
that SDM is the best spatial model for our data. Indeed, if for instance
the eﬀect of spatially lagged explanatory variables (WXt) is not sig-
niﬁcant, then the SLM is better than the SDM. The second step of
Hendry's approach thus consists in comparing the eﬃciency of the SDM
over three nested (simpler) spatial models: the SLM, SLX and SEM. We
thus performWald's restriction tests on the SDM, which are summarized
in Table 5.
Our results clearly point the superiority of the SDM over the SLM,
SEM and SLX models. Indeed, all Wald tests strongly reject the null
hypothesis of preferring a simpler spatial model over an SDM.
Consequently, the spatial dependence in our data seems to be more
complicated than suggested by our theoretical model. Indeed, we have
to include not only the spatial lag of R&D investment (Wyt) but also the
spatial lag of the explanatory variables (WXt). Consequently, public
policies implemented in neighboring regions inﬂuence both directly
(through local spatial dependence) and indirectly (through global
spatial dependence of R&D investment) the R&D investment in a par-
ticular region.
5. Empirical model and results
The previous section allowed us to deﬁne the following character-
istics for our ﬁnal speciﬁcation: A static SDM with structural change in
the eﬀect of GDP and tax credits. This model will be able to address
both the cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity detected in
the FE model. This empirical model is in line with the theoretical
model, which will help us to interpret our empirical estimates. We can
now write our empirical model for a region as follows:
β β β
β
β β β
θ θ θ
θ
θ θ θ
ρ
W W W
W
W W W
W u
ln(DERDF) ln(GDP) ln(GDP) ln(LTC )
ln(LTC )
ln(SNAT) ln(SCEE ) ln(SREG )
ln( GDP) ln( GDP) ln( LTC )
ln( LTC )
ln( SNAT) ln( SCEE ) ln( SREG )
ln( DERD ) ,
t t t t
t
t t t
t t t
t
t t t
t t
1 1 2
2
3 4 5
1 1 2
2
3 4 5
= + △ +
+ △
+ + +
+ + △ +
+ △
+ + +
+ +
(12)
where △ represents the change in the coeﬃcient value in the period
2006–2011 with respect to the baseline period 2001–2005. W refers to
the row-normalized spatial matrix that was constructed using a con-
tiguity criterion such that WGDP represents the weighted mean of GDP
from neighboring regions. ρ is the measure of the global spatial de-
pendence, while the θk parameters measure the local spatial depen-
dence of the exogenous variables. ut= μ+ ηtιn+ εt refers to compo-
nent error term that includes individual and time ﬁxed-eﬀects. By
including individual ﬁxed eﬀects,7 we control for all unobservables that
are region-speciﬁc and time-invariant such as the economic structure,
geography of economic activities and local agglomeration eﬀects. By
including temporal ﬁxed eﬀects, we control for all unobservables that
are time-speciﬁc and common to all regions such as the impact of the
2008 economic crisis. Finally, εt represents the idiosyncratic error term.
In the previous section, we detected two outliers in the data, and all
estimations presented in this paper include dummy variables control-
ling for the inﬂuence of these observations.
5.1. Detection of spatial eﬀects
Table 6 presents the estimation of model (12). At this stage, we
focus on the measure of the spatial component in the model. In the
presence of signiﬁcant spatial dependence ρˆ , the values of coeﬃcients
presented in Table 6 should not be interpreted directly; marginal eﬀects
measuring the eﬃciency of public policies should be recalculated while
taking into account the spatial eﬀects. They will be presented and in-
terpreted in Table 7 in the following subsection.
The last part of the table presents the estimates of the global spatial
dependence existing between private R&D investment in French regions
(ρˆ). We ﬁnd evidence of negative spatial dependence, which highlights
the singularity of the geography of R&D investment in France. Indeed,
looking at Fig. 2, we immediately see that the negative spatial depen-
dence for France traduces the polarization of privately ﬁnanced R&D
investment into a limited number of hubs that are 1) geographically
distant and 2) surrounded by regions that are laggards in privately ﬁ-
nanced R&D. In that sense, the introduction of global spatial depen-
dence into our empirical model allows us to take into account the
economic geography structure of private R&D investment in France.
Table 6 also highlights the presence of local spatial dependence.
However, only two explanatory variables drive this local dependence.
Indeed, it seems that private R&D investment in a region is positively
inﬂuenced by the dynamics of neighboring regions (lnWGDP) and their
ability to receive national funds (lnWSNAT). This clearly indicates that
the private R&D investment in one location is more sensitive to overall
regional dynamics than to purely local dynamics. Moreover, the local
dependence working through national subsidies can be explained by the
increasing geographical consideration in the allocation of those sub-
sidies. Indeed, a signiﬁcant share of national subsidies are implemented
through the competitiveness pole policies or other mechanisms that
support projects in which sectoral and territorial strategies dominate.
Moreover, as most of the clusters ﬁnanced under this policy cross dif-
ferent neighboring NUTS3 regions, it is not surprising to ﬁnd such local
dependence.
To discuss the eﬃciency of the French policy mix for R&D, we need
to calculate the marginal eﬀects because the coeﬃcients in Table 6 do
not take into account the global spatial dependence of R&D investment.
We refer the reader to LeSage and Pace (2009) and Montmartin and
Herrera (2015) who describe how we can derive marginal eﬀects from
spatial econometric estimates. The advantage of marginal eﬀects
Table 4
Comparison between alternative Durbin models: SDM versus SDEM.
Indicator SDM SDEM
Global spatial dependence parameter ρˆ 0.119= − *** λˆ 0.079= − *
AIC 231.641 235.970
BIC 359.636 363.964
Note: Estimation QMLE-FE with robust s.e. and the Lee–Yu correction.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
Table 5
Summary of restriction hypothesis on the SDM.
Null hypothesis Wald test p-Value Selected model
SLM 20.59 0.004 SDM
SEM 21.64 0.003 SDM
SLX 6.66 0.010 SDM
Note: Estimations using QMLE-FE with robust s.e. and the Lee–Yu correction.
7 Note that the introduction of individual ﬁxed eﬀects in spatial models will
yield biased estimates of some parameters. Lee and Yu (2010) analytically
derive, dependent on n and T, the size of the bias and propose some corrections
for the cross-sectional dependence among the observations at each point in
time. We consider this correction in all of the presented estimations.
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derived from a spatial econometric model is that we can divide them
into direct and indirect eﬀects. The direct eﬀect captures the eﬀect in
the own region of a unit change in the explanatory variables. The in-
direct eﬀect captures the eﬀect in the own region of a unit change in the
explanatory variables in all other regions through neighbor relation-
ships. Table 7 reports the total marginal eﬀects by period and divides
them into direct and indirect eﬀects. For comparison purposes, Table 7
also shows the marginal eﬀects obtained from an FE estimator robust to
heteroskedasticity (which would be eﬃcient in the absence of spatial
dependence).
5.2. The importance of spatial eﬀects: the SDM versus a-spatial model
Before analyzing in detail the results provided by our spatial model,
we brieﬂy discuss the importance of using regional data to account for
spatial dependence when assessing the global impact of policies. By
comparing the marginal eﬀects provided by the two models, it clearly
appears that marginal eﬀects from an FE model correspond to the
marginal direct eﬀects of the SDM. In other words, applying an a-spatial
econometric model to regional data within the same country entails
considering each region as a closed economy, which would obviously
lead to strong bias. Table 7 clearly highlights this point. By considering
regions as Robinson islands, the FE estimator produces upward bias in
the eﬀect of most public policies, as we can see by comparing the total
marginal eﬀects obtained by these two models.
5.3. The eﬃciency of the French Policy Mix
Let us start with a few words on the role of the control variable:
GDP. We estimate that a 1% increase in the GDP in all NUTS3 regions
increases privately ﬁnanced R&D investment by approximately 1.2%.8
Note that this eﬀect of GDP is relatively stable over time. Table 7 also
shows that the total eﬀect of GDP is largely due to a signiﬁcant positive
indirect eﬀect. Indeed, the direct eﬀect of GDP is never signiﬁcant and
appears small in magnitude compared to the indirect eﬀect. This clearly
highlights that within France, privately ﬁnanced R&D investment in
one speciﬁc NUTS3 region is more dependent on macroeconomic or
regional conditions than on pure local conditions. This is not surprising
in the sense that R&D projects are not focused on a particular local
market.
Concerning the eﬃciency of the French policy mix, our results place
greater emphasis on the idea of a neutral eﬀect, i.e., a one-for-one
dollar eﬀect. Indeed, as our dependent variable is privately ﬁnanced R&
D (amount of R&D spending minus all public funds and ﬁscal incentives
received), the sign of the coeﬃcients directly indicates whether a policy
generates a crowding-in or a crowding-out eﬀect. When a policy gen-
erates no signiﬁcant eﬀect it means that the policy is not able to in-
crease the level of privately ﬁnanced R&D.
Interestingly, it appears that only national subsidies are able to
generate signiﬁcant crowding-in eﬀects on R&D investment. Indeed,
our results do no reject the hypothesis of an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the
three other policy tools. Nevertheless, we do not accept the hypothesis
of a crowding-out eﬀect for any policies. We will now discuss our re-
sults in more detail using the computed direct and indirect marginal
eﬀects.
We start with the only policy tool demonstrating a capacity to
generate crowding-in eﬀects: national subsidies. We estimate that a 1%
increase in the national subsidies in all NUTS3 regions will be able to
generate a 0.071% increase in privately ﬁnanced R&D investment.
Table 7 also shows that the total eﬀect of national subsidies is due to
positive direct and indirect eﬀects. Indeed, both the direct and indirect
eﬀects of subsidies are signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude. This sug-
gests that national subsidies directed toward diﬀerent NUTS3 regions
are geographically complementary and boost ﬁrms’ R&D investment.
The implications of our theoretical model and the speciﬁcity of those
subsidies are able to partially explain our result. Indeed, our theoretical
Table 6
Estimation of a general spatial Durbin model with structural break.
Local coeﬃcients Coef. s.e. t-Test
ln(GDP) 0.129 0.377 0.342
ln(LTC) 0.157** 0.050 3.125
ln(SNAT) 0.035* 0.017 2.014
ln(SCEE) 0.016* 0.007 2.376
ln(SREG) 0.010 0.006 1.772
Change (△ coeﬃcients) in 2006–2011 compared to 2002–2005
ln(GDP) 0.181*** 0.048 3.774
ln(LTC) −0.149*** 0.029 −5.073
Local spatial coeﬃcients Coef. s.e. t-Test
ln(WGDP) 1.256** 0.463 2.713
ln(WLTC) −0.107 0.071 −1.495
ln(WSNAT) 0.044* 0.021 2.072
ln(WSCEE) −0.016 0.011 −1.520
ln(WSREG) −0.011 0.011 −0.968
Change (△ coeﬃcients) in 2006–2011 compared to 2002–2005
ln(WGDP) −0.182** 0.109 −1.668
ln(WLTC) 0.042 0.057 0.726
Global spatial coeﬃcient Coef. s.e. t-Test
ρˆSpatial parameter ( ) −0.119*** 0.046 −2.581
Notes: △ captures the increment of each period with respect to period
2009–2011.
Constant terms are omitted. Estimation QMLE-FE using xsmle (Belotti et al.,
2014) with robust s.e. and the Lee–Yu correction (Lee and Yu, 2010).
* Signiﬁcance at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1%.
Table 7
Marginal eﬀects of SDM versus FE model with structural break.
MODEL SDM FE
Variable Periods Periods
2002–2005 2006–2011 2002–2005 2006–2011
Direct eﬀects
GDP 0.114 0.293 0.219 0.372
LTC 0.163*** 0.011 0.165*** 0.018
SNAT 0.033* 0.033* 0.030* 0.030*
SCEE 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018** 0.018**
SREG 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010*
Indirect eﬀects
GDP 1.151*** 0.977** n/a n/a
LTC −0.121* −0.064 n/a n/a
SNAT 0.037* 0.037* n/a n/a
SCEE −0.017* −0.016* n/a n/a
SREG −0.011 −0.011 n/a n/a
Total eﬀects
GDP 1.265*** 1.269*** 0.219 0.372
LTC 0.042 −0.053 0.165*** 0.018
SNAT 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.030* 0.030*
SCEE 0.001 0.001 0.018** 0.017**
SREG −0.001 −0.001 0.010* 0.010*
Note: Estimation SDM under QMLE-FE with robust s.e. and the Lee-Yu correc-
tion (Lee and Yu, 2010) using xsmle (Belotti et al., 2014), no. simula-
tions= 999.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
8 However, the test of an elasticity equal to one is not rejected for the two
periods.
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model suggests that a public policy is more likely to generate a
crowding-in eﬀect if its ﬁnancial endowment is high and/or the policy
is targeted. National subsidies were the most important R&D policy tool
in France until 2009 and represent more than 7% of total private R&D
expenses during our period of study. Contrary to tax credits, national
subsidies are necessarily targeted toward territories (cluster policies),
SMEs and/or speciﬁc sectors. Thus, this policy tool is able to take into
account the speciﬁcity of the French geography of innovative activities,
reinforcing the complementarity between territories and limiting pure
competitive eﬀects.
We now focus on our result on the tax credit policy. We ﬁnd evi-
dence of a neutral impact of the French tax credit system. Nevertheless,
this global result conceals interesting implications for the French policy
mix, as both temporal and spatial eﬀects are at work. Indeed, contrary
to other policies, we detect a change in the eﬀect of tax credits on R&D
investment that corresponds to the transition from a purely incremental
scheme to a pure-volume scheme. Indeed, while we ﬁnd evidence of a
strong positive, direct eﬀect of tax credits in the ﬁrst period
(2002–2005), this eﬀect disappears in the second (2006–2011). This is
in line with microeconomic studies such as Lokshin and Mohnen (2012)
or Marino et al. (2016). The global neutral eﬀect of tax credits is also
explained by the presence of a signiﬁcant negative indirect eﬀect that
counterbalances the positive direct eﬀect. This is principally because
French tax credit policy is untargeted, meaning that it cannot overcome
the existence of negative spatial dependence in R&D investment in
France. In a sense, if tax credits beneﬁt regional R&D hubs in France
and drive their investment in R&D, this comes at the expense of laggard
neighboring regions, implying a neutral total eﬀect.
Concerning the two other sources of direct support, regional sub-
sidies and European subsidies, we ﬁnd evidence of a neutral total im-
pact. One explanation suggested by our theoretical model is that the
size of such policies (0.5% of total private R&D spending) is not suﬃ-
cient to generate a visible crowding-in eﬀect at the regional level.9
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the estimated impact decreases with
the size of the policy. The direct elasticity of R&D investment with re-
spect to the received national subsidies is estimated at 0.033, and these
subsidies represent more than 7% of private R&D spending. The elas-
ticity with respect to European subsidies is estimated at 0.017, and they
represent just over 0.5% of private spending. Finally, the elasticity with
respect to regional subsidies is estimated at 0.01, and they represent
less than 0.5% of private spending. Moreover, our results highlight a
diﬀerence in the impacts of these latter two sources of ﬁnancing. In-
deed, European subsidies generate strong positive direct eﬀects that are
counterbalanced by weak negative indirect eﬀects. Regional subsidies
generate weak direct eﬀects and non-signiﬁcant negative indirect ef-
fects. The diﬀerence in the direct eﬀects of the two policies can be
explained by the fact that European subsidies exceeds regional subsidies
and are more spatially concentrated. Indeed, by nature, European po-
licies can more eﬃciently target sectors and territories than local po-
licies. European subsidies can be seen as useful in the sense that they
are able to generate a “direct” crowding-in eﬀect for a targeted region
(if other regions are not subsidized). In a sense, this suggests that fur-
ther increasing the concentration of European subsidies could improve
their total impact. These two policies also generate negative indirect
eﬀects that contrast with the positive eﬀects found for national sub-
sidies. That can be partially explained by the fact that collaborative
incentives provided by European and local funds are more likely to
encourage competition eﬀects between French territories rather than to
encourage complementarity eﬀects. Indeed, European support targets
collaborative projects with European partners, whereas local policies
target more collaborative projects between local actors. By contrast, the
national subsidies appear to be the only source of direct support capable
of leveraging the complementarity among French regions by ﬁnancing
collaborative projects that involve actors from various French regions.
This null total eﬀect of European and regional public support does not
mean that such eﬀorts are not useful, but they are not capable of in-
troducing a global leverage eﬀect.
6. Conclusion
The French policy mix for R&D and innovation is one of the most
generous and market-friendly systems in the world, particularly since
the 2004–2008 reforms of French R&D tax credit. It has experienced
what are likely its most important changes over the past decade. The
main objective of this paper has been to investigate the macroeconomic
impact on private R&D investment of the French policy mix using a
unique database that covers all French metropolitan NUTS3 regions
over the period 2001–2011. Information concerning the amount of R&D
tax credits and the amounts of regional, national and European sub-
sidies received by ﬁrms in each region was used to this eﬀect. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that uses a spatial model to evaluate a
policy mix (four diﬀerent instruments) using regional data.
As the basis for our empirical approach, we developed a simple
regional R&D investment model based on Howe and McFetridge (1976).
This allowed us to highlight some conditions that increase the like-
lihood that an R&D policy generates a crowding-in or a crowding-out
eﬀect on private R&D investment. Among our ﬁndings, our model
suggests that the regional impact of public R&D support can vary
greatly according to the local economic structure (sectorial specializa-
tion, ﬁnancial constraints of local ﬁrms) and the design of the policy
(size and targeting). Moreover, by introducing interactions among re-
gions, our model also highlights the importance of taking into account
the existence of localized R&D spillovers to correctly assess the impact
of a policy. Indeed, such spillovers generate spatial dependence in the
level of R&D investment that can strongly inﬂuence the overall impact
of a policy.
Our ﬁnal empirical speciﬁcation combined the elements provided
by this theoretical model with a data-driven analysis. Indeed, due to the
important changes in the French policy mix during the past decade, we
detected the presence of structural breaks in the eﬀects of some ex-
planatory variables. Thus, we ﬁnally estimated a spatial Durbin model
(SDM) with regime and ﬁxed eﬀects, which allowed us to take into
account the spatial dependency that exists between NUTS3 regions and
the structural changes in the eﬀects of R&D policies on R&D investment
during the considered period.
Most of the empirical results we obtain conﬁrm the theoretical
predictions of our theoretical model. The ﬁrst main result is the pre-
sence of a signiﬁcant negative spatial dependence in privately ﬁnanced
R&D investment in NUTS3 regions. This result reveals one speciﬁcity of
the geography of R&D activities in France: the polarization of business
R&D investment into a limited number of hubs that are geographically
distant and surrounding by laggard regions. In this context in which
hubs are strengthening at the expense of laggard regions, untargeted
state policies or competitive local policies are likely to act as beggar-
thy-neighbor policies. This element partly explains why we ﬁnd that
French tax credits and local subsidies do not generate crowing-in eﬀects
at the regional level.
The second main result, which stems from the ﬁrst, is that evalu-
ating the French policy mix with an a-spatial model would lead to
strong upward bias in the eﬀect of these policies. Whereas we ﬁnd that
national subsidies are the only instrument that generates signiﬁcant
crowding-in eﬀects on R&D investment, an a-spatial model would lead
to the same conclusion for all policies studied. This is because the latter
approach does not take spatial dependence into account.
9 This does not mean that regional or European subsidies are without utility.
Indeed, even if the size of those policies implies a neutral impact at the regional
level, such policies can increase R&D investment at the ﬁrm or consortium
level, or also contribute to other policy objectives such as the development of
public/private collaborations, for example.
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The third main result is that we found evidence that the design of
policies (size and targeting) is extremely important for their eﬃciency,
as suggested by our theoretical model. Indeed, although we found that
national subsidies are able to generate a visible crowding-in eﬀect,
European and local subsidies seem to have a neutral eﬀect. National
policies represent more than 7% of private R&D spending, whereas
European subsidies and local subsidies represent only 0.5%.10 More-
over, an important share of national subsidies support collaborative
projects through clusters that cross diﬀerent regions, whereas the two
other policies support collaborative projects with foreign partners or
local partners. Consequently, European and local subsidies are more
likely to encourage competition eﬀects between French territories ra-
ther than to encourage complementarity eﬀects.
The last main result is evidence that the passage from a purely
incremental scheme to a pure-volume scheme for the French tax credit
modiﬁed the response of ﬁrms to this ﬁscal incentive. In line with the
results provided by Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) or Marino et al.
(2016), we ﬁnd a strong negative change in the impact of tax credits
on R&D investment between the ﬁrst period (2002–2005) and the
second (2006–2011). This corroborates the idea that a purely volume-
based scheme generates more windfall eﬀects than an incremental
scheme.
Finally, from a global perspective, our results highlight a rather
limited eﬀectiveness of the French policy mix for R&D in the sense that
no policies generate signiﬁcant crowding-out eﬀects and one is able to
generate signiﬁcant crowding-in eﬀects. Nevertheless, our paper also
reveals some problems with the decisions made during the 2000s that
did not improve (namely, reduced) the eﬀectiveness of the French
policy mix for R&D. Indeed, the choice to switch to a tax-credit-driven
policy mix does not seem to be very eﬀective for two reasons. First,
contrary to national subsidies, tax credits are not targeted, and their
total eﬀect is thus strongly inﬂuenced by the negative spatial depen-
dence of R&D investment existing across French regions. Second, by
choosing a volume-based scheme, the natural eﬀectiveness of tax
credits is decreased. Another limitation of the reform of the French
policy mix concerns the subsidies allocated by local authorities, which
increased structurally in the period considered. Because, by deﬁnition,
such subsidies increase competition between territories with a very
unequal geography of R&D activities, they are more likely to operate
as beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Thus, from a policy-maker perspec-
tive, our empirical ﬁndings suggest diﬀerent ways to improve the ef-
fectiveness of the French policy mix for R&D. One improvement could
be to modify the tax credit scheme. Indeed, reintroducing an incre-
mental component, especially for large ﬁrms, could signiﬁcantly re-
duce observed windfall eﬀects and free up funds to increase the ﬁ-
nancial endowments of institutions awarding national grants (like BPI
France or the Competitive Cluster Policy). Another way to increase the
eﬀectiveness of the tax credit scheme would be to introduce a more
targeted approach, for instance, by implementing diﬀerent levels of
tax credits by region and/or sector. Such changes could allow a sig-
niﬁcant increase in the eﬀectiveness of the French Tax credit policy by
taking into account both the negative spatial dependence between
French regions and the heterogeneous reaction of industries to ﬁscal
incentives. Another modiﬁcation that could increase the eﬀectiveness
of the French policy-mix for R&D would be to create a political co-
ordination mechanism between local policy-makers in order to reduce
competition eﬀects and increase complementary eﬀects between
French regions.
However, our results concern a period prior to the discussion and
implementation of the “smart specialization” strategy in Europe (Foray,
2014). It would be interesting to more speciﬁcally analyze the role of
regional R&D subsidies in this new context to determine whether this
strategy has contributed to improving the total eﬃciency of regional R&
D policies. Indeed, solutions to reduce the negative indirect eﬀects of
local policies and increase their local impact, even when their weight
remains rather low, necessitate regions having better capacity to focus
their policies toward the identiﬁcation and valorization of their com-
plementarity with others.
Our results also suggest other avenues for future research.
Extending the period of analysis would allow us to develop a dynamic
model to distinguish short-run and long-run eﬀects and consider the
impact on innovation performance (see Minniti and Venturini, 2017 for
instance). A null impact of policy on the amount of business R&D
spending may indeed translate into a positive impact on innovation if
policies help ﬁrms to improve the productivity of R&D activities. Fi-
nally, conﬁrming the importance of spatial analysis for policy evalua-
tion would require the extension of our analysis to other countries with
diﬀerent spatial conﬁgurations and possibly positive spatial depen-
dence for private R&D, such as Germany.
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Appendix A. Non-linear estimates
In this appendix, we present a non-linear estimation of model (3). To obtain these non linear estimates, we ﬁrst run an FE model to obtain
estimated values for the coeﬃcients that we use as starting values in the non-linear estimates. We use ﬁve explanatory variables in both the FE and
non-linear models to explain the level of privately ﬁnanced R&D (ln(DERDF)): ln(GDP), ln(LTC) (lag of Tax credit), ln(SNAT) (National Subsidies), ln
(SCEE) (European Subsidies) and ln(SREG) (Regional subsidies).
Table A.1 summarizes the non-linear estimates we obtain under diﬀerent initial values of ρ and the constant.
As we can see from the table, model better ﬁts the data when the ρ parameter is near zero. Consequently, in main body of the paper, we assume
that ρ→ 0.
10 This implies that these policies are less visible at the aggregate level but does not mean that such policies are useless at the microeconomic level.
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Appendix B. Location of tax credit
General problems concerning the location of the amount tax credit received in each region is that the necessary information is dispersed into
diﬀerent databases. On the one hand information on the spatial distribution of R&D investment of ﬁrms is available through the R&D survey
collected each year by the French Ministry of Research and can be easily aggregated at the NUTS3 level. On the other hand, information on TC is
collected by ﬁscal authorities and aggregated at NUTS3 level by French Ministry of Research. However, TC is attributed to the address of head-
quarters or ﬁscal holdings for ﬁscally integrated groups, which do not correspond to the place where R&D is eﬀectively carried on. So in order to
correctly geolocalized tax credit in each region we constructed a relocalized measure using ﬁscal information and localized information contained in
the R&D survey. As the design of TC is diﬀerent according to the size of beneﬁciaries, we took into account this dimension. For each year, we ﬁrst
calculate, for each department, the national share of DERD for each category of enterprise (s∈ {1, …, S}, S=5).11 The following methodology is
used.
First, we estimate the internal R&D expenditures of a category s in a given NUTS3 region i at time t:
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where DRD is the amount of declared R&D for a category s in a given NUTS i (original ﬁscal data). We then calculate the average tax credit rate for a
given sector s:
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The amount of tax credit that would theoretically be obtained by each NUTS3 at time t is ﬁnally estimated by:
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Appendix C. Checking common issues on panel data
In this appendix, we report statistical tests related to the main issues encountered in panel data: serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, cross-
sectional correlation, endogeneity and stationarity. All of these tests are obtained using a static FE model, our ﬁve main explanatory variables and
temporal dummies.
C.1 Serial correlation
Table C.1 presents two diﬀerent ﬁrst-order serial correlation tests in the residuals (obtained after FE estimation).
The two versions of Born and Breitung tests reject the presence of ﬁrst-order serial correlation. We therefore conclude that that there is an
absence of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals.
C.2 Heteroskedasticity
The Table C.2 presents an LR test of heteroskedasticity. This tests compare GLS estimates under heteroskedasticity within panels with a GLS
estimates under homoscedasticity. If there is no problem of heteroskedasticity, then the goodness-of-ﬁt values of the two estimates should be similar
and the LR statistic should be low, leading us to accept the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.
The results presented in Table C.2 strongly reject the null hypothesis of the absence of heteroskedasticity. As a consequence, we have to correct
for the variance/covariance matrix of the residuals to account for the presence of heteroskedasticity.
Table A.1
Summary of nonlinear least-squares.
Estimation Initial value for
ρ
Initial value for
constant
Estimated ρ RSS
1 0.60 10 0.8052 10859.76
2 0.30 10 0.0315 141.5327
3 0.20 10 0.1996 4960.819
4 0.15 10 0.1779 4615.252
5 0.10 10 0.0010 1397.778
6 0.10 30 0.0008 157.9092
7 0.10 50 0.0013 118.1107
11 1: enterprises with 1–50 employees; 2: enterprises with 51–250 employees; 3: enterprises with 251–500 employees; 4: enterprises with 501–2000 employees; 5:
enterprises with more than 2000 employees. However, data from the R&D survey cannot provide us with the distribution of DERD among the diﬀerent categories of
enterprises in each department. Hence we used information on the proportion of R&D declared to ﬁscal authorities in each category of enterprises in order to estimate
the amount of R&D in each category of enterprise.
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C.3 Cross-sectional correlation
Table C.3 presents the results of the CD-Test that detects cross-sectional correlation. The null hypothesis of this test is the absence of cross-
sectional correlation.
We applied the CD test to the residuals obtained after an FE estimation and to our dependent variable. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of no
cross-sectional dependence. Consequently, the FE estimator is inconsistent and ineﬃcient.
C.4 Endogeneity
Concerning endogeneity, we could easily suspect problems of omitted variables because (1) the true theoretical model could be dynamic rather
than static, and (2) some of the explanatory variables may be endogenous. To check these two points, we ﬁrst estimates a dynamic model using two
diﬀerent estimators (FE and 2-step GMM) and check the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient related to the temporal lag of the dependent variable, i.e.,
DERDF at t-1 (named LDERDF). Table C.4 presents the estimation results.
As we can see from Table C.4, the coeﬃcient of the past level of privately ﬁnanced R&D (LDERDF) is never signiﬁcant, regardless of the estimator
used. Consequently, our static speciﬁcation is preferred over a dynamic speciﬁcation, and no endogeneity is suspected in a dynamic framework.
The second point related to endogeneity is that some of our explanatory variables could be endogenous. To avoid the endogeneity problem with
the tax credit variable (which is a percentage of R&D spending), we decided to use its ﬁrst-order temporal lag (i.e., TC at t-1, named LTC). Table C.5
presents the C-Test for endogeneity detection for all explanatory variables.
As we can see from this table, for all explanatory variables, we never reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the regressors. Consequently,
we are conﬁdent that we are working with exogenous explanatory variables.
C.5 Stationarity
It is important to verify the stationarity of both the right- and left-hand sides of our empirical model, as estimates on non-stationary variable can
lead to spurious regression problems. Table C.6 presents three diﬀerent unit root tests for stationarity for both the dependent and explanatory
Table C.1
Serial correlation of residuals.
Test Null hypothesis Stat p-Value
Born and Breitung. HR-test no AR(1) process −0.730 0.466
Born and Breitung. LM-test no AR(1) process 0.200 0.843
Note: Linear Panel Model with FE by cross-section and time without spatial eﬀects. Outlier controls are included.
Table C.2
LR test for heteroskedasticity.
Test d.f. Chi-2 stat p-Value
LR-test 93 1389.18 0.000
Note: Linear Panel Model with FE by cross-section and time without spatial eﬀects. Outlier controls are
included.
Table C.3
Cross-section correlation.
Variable CD-test Abs (corr.)
Statistic p-Value
ln(DERDF) 35.70 0.000 0.359
residuals 3.37 0.001 0.315
Note: The results are based on CD test (Pesaran, 2004).
Table C.4
Dynamic models: FE & 2-step GMM Arellano–Bond estimators.
FE 2-step GMM AB
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Stat p-Value Coeﬃcient t-Stat p-Value
ln(LDERDF) −0.088 −0.78 0.437 −0.148 −0.99 0.323
ln(GDP) 0.064 0.11 0.912 −0.873 −0.99 0.322
ln(LTC) 0.191 0.29 0.770 −0.181 −2.17 0.030
ln((SNAT) 0.784 1.58 0.118 0.072 1.59 0.113
ln(SCEE) 0.017 1.96 0.053 −0.002 −0.26 0.792
ln(SREG) 0.016 2.31 0.023 0.020 2.73 0.006
Note: Linear Panel Model with FE by cross-section and time without spatial eﬀects. Outlier controls are included.
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variables.
As we can see from this table, whatever the unit root test used or variable considered, we always reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary
panels. Consequently, we are conﬁdent that we are working with stationary variables.
Appendix D. Detecting temporal changes in estimated coeﬃcients
Given the importance of changes in the French policy mix for R&D during the period covered in this study, we may suspect that the behavior of
ﬁrms in regions have changed. To test this assumption, we run diﬀerent Chow tests to check the stability of our estimated coeﬃcients over time.
We start by checking for the presence of a global structural break by testing simultaneously the stability of all coeﬃcients between two periods.
As we do not know which is the best candidate year for the break, we report in Table D.1 global structural break tests for ﬁve diﬀerent break year
candidates.
As we can see from Table D.1, except for the year 2010, we always reject the null hypothesis of the stability of all coeﬃcients. As a consequence,
this table highlights the presence of a global structural break in the eﬀect of our explanatory variable. To choose the best year for the break between
our four candidates (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009), we run FE estimates and compare their eﬃciency using diﬀerent information criteria. The
information criteria of these models are presented in Table D.2.
The three information criteria select the year 2006 as the best year to capture the change in the eﬀect of the explanatory variables. A last point is
Table C.5
Endogeneity tests.
Variable C test
Statistic p-Value
ln(GDP) 0.418 0.518
ln(LTC) 2.513 0.113
ln(SNAT) 1.236 0.266
ln(SCEE) 0.337 0.561
ln(SREG) 1.293 0.255
Note: The results are based on the diﬀerence between Sargan–Hansen tests.
Table C.6
Unit root test for the dependent and explanatory variables.
Method H I
H I
: (1)
: (0)
0
1
Conclusion
Unit root speciﬁc for each
region
Statistic p-Value
log(DERD) Harris-Tzavalis
testa
−0.30 0.00 I (0)
IPS Z-t-tilde-bar −2.88 0.00 I (0)
Pesaran's CADF
test
−9.25 0.00 I (0)
log(GDP) Harris-Tzavalis
testa
−0.31 0.03 I (0)
IPS Z-t-tilde-bar −2.88 0.00 I (0)
Pesaran's CADF
test
−5.53 0.00 I (0)
log(LLTC) Harris-Tzavalis
testa
−0.13 0.00 I (0)
IPS Z-t-tilde-bar −9.43 0.00 I (0)
Pesaran's CADF
test
−5.76 0.00 I (0)
log(SubNat) Harris-Tzavalis
testa
−0.04 0.00 I (0)
IPS Z-t-tilde-bar −9.60 0.00 I (0)
Pesaran's CADF
test
−3.76 0.00 I (0)
log(SubCEE) Harris-Tzavalis
testa
−0.15 0.00 I (0)
IPS Z-t-tilde-bar −8.96 0.00 I (0)
Pesaran's CADF
test
−2.51 0.04 I (0)
log(SubReg) Harris-Tzavalis
testa
−0.09 0.00 I (0)
IPS Z-t-tilde-bar −10.20 0.00 I (0)
Pesaran's CADF
test
−9.61 0.00 I (0)
Notes: IPS (Im et al., 2003). For Pesaran (2007) test we report the standardized Z-tbar statistic and its p-value.
The tests for H I: (1)0 included a constant and trend.
a The HT test assumes a common unit root in the panel.
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necessary to correctly specify the temporal change in our data. If we detect a global structural break in 2006, we do not know whether this break
comes from changes in the coeﬃcients of all explanatory variables of only some of them. We thus need to run a Chow test to verify individually the
stability of the coeﬃcients of all explanatory variable. The results of these tests are provided in Table D.3.
Δ represents the coeﬃcient change for the variable for the period 2006–2011 with respect to the baseline period 2002–2005. The individual
Chow tests clearly highlight that only two variables explain the global structural break that we detected previously. We reject at less than 1% the null
hypothesis of coeﬃcient stability for the GDP and the tax credit variables. For the other variables, we accept the null hypothesis of coeﬃcient
stability over the two periods.
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